University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1965

Intracompany pricing
William L. Felix
The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Felix, William L., "Intracompany pricing" (1965). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional
Papers. 2735.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/2735

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

INTRACOMPANY PRICING

By

WILLIAM L. FELIX, JR.
B. S. Montana State University, 1961
Presented in partiCiI fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science
MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
1965

Approved by;

Chairman, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

MAY 1 3 )965
Date

UMI Number; EP34512

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMT
DteMlMion P^iWiing

UMI EP34512
Published by ProQuest LLC (2012). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

Chapter
I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

INTRODUCTION -- DECENTRALIZATION AND
TRANSFER PRICING

Page

1

A N OVERVIEW OF TRANSFER PRICING METHODS . . . . 10

TRANSFER PRICING AND EVALUATION OF
PROFIT CENTERS

15

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSFER PRICING IN
DECISION MAKING

29

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SUMMARY

47

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A Management Problem
The size and complexity of business enterprises have increased
tremendously since the beginning of this century.

To cope with this situation,

the science of management has been developed extensively.

Huge businesses

such as Dupont, Sears Roebuck, General Electric, and General Motors have
given considerable study to the field of management in order to find better ways
of solving the problems of modern business.

As a result of such study, these

companies have modified much of their earlier thinking on the most effective
use of management talent.
In many of these large firms more effective management has been
achieved by a greater delegation of authority. This delegation is accomplished
by decentralization.

Decentralization is a philosophy of organization and manage

ment that goes beyond mere delegation of authority.
persal and concentration of authority.

It implies both selective dis

Careful selection of what to place at lower

levels in the organization structure and what to hold at the top, specific policy
making to guide decision making, selection and training of personnel, and adequate

1
controls are all prerequisites to successful decentralization .
Decentralization of authority is a relative situation.
tralization or centralization of authority is very unlikely.

Absolute decen

Absolute centralization

Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co./ 1964), p. 318.
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could exist, but this would imply no subordinate managers or organization.
Absolute decentralization could not exist because, if the manager delegates all of
his authority, he is no longer a manager; there would again be no organization.
Both decentralization and centralization, then, are degrees of delegation of
authority.
The degree of decentralization is affected by many factors, not the least
of which is the desires of the company's incumbent top management. If these execu
tives dislike delegating their authority, decentralization will tend to be limited .
However, there are a number of factors beyond the executives* control which affect
the degree of decentralization. Two of the most important factors are the size of
the firm and the desire for independence.
As the firm grows in size, more and more decisions have to be made.
all decisions are referred to top management, a backlog is likely to occur.

If

Slow

decisions are costly because they result in lost sales or missed opportunities. To
minimize this cost, the decision level must be as close as possible to the transaction.
This can be accomplished by decentralization.
The desire for some degree of independence and a sense of achievement
is characteristic of individuals.

Providing for independence can also be rewarding

to the company because it tends to encourage initiative and improvement of manage
ment skills. Well-planned decentralization should allow people to achieve a feel
ing of independence and participation in the affairs of the company while retain
ing the efficiencies of centralized coordination and control.
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Profit Centers
A teehnique that has been used to control decentralized authority is the
profit center.

Profit centers are operating units, divisions or departments,that are

evaluated primarily in terms of profits earned. Top management delegates to the
unit manager authority over most of the major determinants of the unit's profits.

In

theory, the unit manager then runs the operating unit as a separate business, subject
only to policies and guides set down by top management.

Joel Dean has suggested

the following as essential characteristics of a profit center:
1.

2

Operational independence— Each profit center must be an inde
pendent operating unit and its manager must have control over
most, if not all, of the factors affecting profits.

This would

require that he have considerable discretion in determining the
operating methods, production volume, product mix, and so forth,
subject only to broad policies and standards set by top manage
ment.
2.

Access to sources and markets— The profit center manager
should be free to buy and sell in alternative markets both inside
and outside the company.

3.

Separable costs and-revenoe

A profit center must be able to

split off its costs and find an-economically realistic price for

2

Joel Dean, "Decentralization and Intracompany Pricing,"
Harvard Business Review, XXXIll (July-August, 1955), p. 67.
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its-end products; otherwise/ measurement of its profit performance
i? impossible.
4.

Management intent— Only if the basic intent of the operating
unit is profits should it be treated as a profit center.

A basic assumption implied in the use of profit centers is that any increase
in operating unit profits will increase the total company profits by a similar amount.
The unit manager is encouraged to increase his unit's profits by any means at his
disposal because his performance is measured, in large part, by these profits. The
profitability of an operating unit will undoubtedly influence top management in
allocating funds for capital additions or improvements. Thus, the operating unit's
profits are used for evaluation and for decision making by both the division mana ger and by top management.
A reliable unit profit computation must be established if the resulting
profit is to be relied on.

Reliable divisional or departmental profit figures are

difficult to achieve. The primary cause of this difficulty is the fact that the opera
ting unit is not really independent.

Because the operating unit is only semi-inde-

pendent, the problems of pricing goods transferred between operating units (intracompany transfer pricing) and allocating central office and service unit costs to
the operating units must be solved.

In addition, if a return on investment in unit

facilities is used, a problem arises in comparing facilities of different ages and
operations that require different amounts of invested capital.
When the operating units participate in the processing and sale of the
same product, intracompany transfer pricing is a significant factor in the

5
determination of unit profits.

The revenue of the selling unit and the purchase

costs of the buying unit are directly affected by the price placed on goods trans
ferred.

Determination of a price fair to both units is a must if the divisions or

departments are to be evaluated as profit centers.
Allocation of the costs of the service units of the company (central
office costs, research and development costs, and so forth) is important .

These

expenses as well as those of the operating units must be covered if the company is
going to be profitable. However, allocation of these costs to the operating units
tends to be arbitrary. For example, how much of the president's salary should be
allocated to each unit? Probably the most practical solution to this problem is
the use of a "stepped" divisional income statement.

On a stepped income state

ment, allocated central office and service costs are deducted at the bottom of the
3
statement from divisional profits before deduction of allocated costs.

When the

allocation of costs cannot be determined equitably, the division can be evaluated
in terms of profits before deduction of allocated costs.
Form of Organization
The preceding comments have not indicated the form of organization
required to implement decentralization.

Because decentralization is essentially

a process of delegation, it is possible to use a variety of organizational structures.
The most commonly used structures appear to be the corporate division or depart
ment and the subsidiary. Their popularity is due to the need for a separation

^See Gordon Shillinglaw, "Guides to Internal Profit Measurement,"
Harvard Business Review, XXXV (March-April, 1957), pp. 82-94.
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of operations to facilitate evaluation.

The primary difference between divisions

or departments and subsidiaries is that the division and the department are a part
of the parent corporation v/hile the subsidiary is a separate legal entity
separate corporation. The division and the department differ only in name,
though the term division seems to imply a larger, more autonomous unit .

The

division appears to be the most popular of the three forms of organizing profit
centers.

4

Decentralization and Profit Centers in Perspective
The use of profit centers in the framework of a decentralized manage
ment system appears to be workable if the problems of effective evaluation and
decision-making are solved.

Perhaps some insight into the solution of these prob

lems can be gained by introducing the philosophy of management used by General
Motors.
The General Motors Corporation is a dramatically successful company
in a competitive and dynamic industry. This success is probably due to a number
of things, but it seems certain that considerable contribution has been made by
the company's management philosophy.

Decentralization at General Motors

means decentralized authority with coordinated control by top management.

5

4
See Robert W. Murphy, "Corporate Divisions vs. Subsidiaries,"
Harvard Business Review^, XXXIV (November-December, 1956), pp. 83-92.

5

Koontz and O'Donnell, p. 330.
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Subject to broad corporate policy, each division — such as Chevrolet, Allison,
and Frigidaire

— operates much as an independent business.

Peter Drucker interviewed a number of the company's executives and

6

summarized their views as to the advantages of decentralization as follows:
1.

Speed and lack of confusion in decision making.

2,

Absence of conflict between top management and the divisions.

3.

A sense of fairness in dealing with executives, confidence that a job
well done would be appreciated, and a lack of politics in the
organization.

4.

Infomiality and democracy in management.

5.

Absence of a gap between a few top managers and the many subor
dinate managers in the organization.

6.

The (availability of a large reservoir of promotable managerial man
power .

7.

Ready visibility of weak managements through results of semiindependent and often competitive divisions.

8.

An absence of "edit management" and the presence of thorough
information and consideration of central management decisions.

How did General Motors solve the problems of evaluating its divisions?
General Motors' system of evaluation solves these problems by admitting they
exist. The operating divisions are evaluated in terms of such long-term

^Koontz and O'Donnell, p. 330, citing P. F. Drucker, Concept of the
Corporation, (New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1946).
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considerations as market penetration, personnel training, and product develop
ment in addition to profits measured by the rate of return earned on invested
capital.

The use of a number of evaluation standards in conjunction with

knowledge of the effects of such problems as pricing intracompany transfers and
allocating central office costs results in an analysis which minimizes the effect of
these evaluation problems.
The General Electric Company also uses a variety of measurements in
evaluating its decentralized divisions.

In addition to divisional profits, the market

position, productivity, product leadership, personnel development, employee

8

attitudes, and the public responsibility of the divisions are considered significant.
Evaluations based on a number of factors are less likely to be weakened by the
deficiencies in measuring any one factor.
History of Decentralization
Some of the earliest examples of decentralization are found in the
holding companies that developed in this country around the turn of the century.
A holding company is a corporation that acquires control of a number of other
corporations forming a loose association.

The holding company did not carry on

any operations of its own; it simply controlled its subsidiaries.

The holding com

pany's management of its subsidiaries was decentralized to an extreme in those

^Alfred P. Sloane, "My Years With General MotorsF o r t u n e ,
September, 1963, p. 147.

g

Ralph J. Cordiner, New Frontiers for Professional Managers
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 100-101.
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cases where no attempt was made to coordinate the activities of the group.
The deficiencies of this form of organization can be illustrated by the
troubles experienced by the General Motors Corporation in 1920 and 1921.

At

that time General Motors was a loosely controlled group of automobile and auto
mobile accessory manufacturers put together by W. C- Durant . The lack of coor
dination and communication among the various subsidiaries and the parent corpora
tion almost bankrupted the group during the economic decline of the early 1920s.
Top management was hampered by the absence of an adequate reporting system to
apprise them of actions taken by the operating executives.

9

Because of this lack

of information, no one was aware until it was too late that the company had
entered the economic decline with excessive inventories and no plans for reducing
production. The powerful financial influence of the Dupont family prevented the
collapse of the company.

This early experience of Genera! Motors is a good illus

tration of the importance of adequate control and coordination by top management
in a decentralized organization.
Since World War 11^ the rapid increase in the size of business firms has
increased the pressure for more effective management tools. Many of these large
firms have selected decentralization as the most promising answer to their manage
ment problems.

A partial list of these businesses includes General Motors, Gener

al Electric, Sears Roebuck & Company, General Dynamics Corporation^ Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey, and Armour & Company.

9

Alfred P. Sloane, p. 141.

CHAPTER 11
AN OVERVIEW OF TRANSFER PRICING METHODS

Divisional or departmental income figures are somev/hat unreliable as
standards for evaluation.

This weakness in the profit center concept is caused by

difficulties in determining accurate revenue and expense figures. An example of
such a difficulty is the pricing of goods transferred within the company.

This

pricing is called intracompany pricing or transfer pricing.
In this chapter, the basic methods of pricing intracompany transfers
will be described and discussed briefly. Their application to the problems of
evaluating a profit center and providing reliable information for decision making
will be deferred to Chapters III and IV

respectively.

What is a Transfer Price-?
A transfer price is the net value per unit of goods transferred between
1
operating units of the same company.

An example would be the price of gaso

line used to record the transfer of a tankcar of gasoline from the refining division
to the marketing division of a decentralized oil company. The transfer price used
to record the "sale" might be full cost, marginal cost, cost plus a fair return,
market, or a negotiated price . Each of these methods of pricing intracompany
transfers is currently being used by industry .
Full Cost
When cost is used as the transfer price of a product, it usually means
full cost or standard cost.

Full cost would include both the direct costs of

^Joel Dean, p. 66.
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producing the transferred goods (materials, labor, and manufacturing overhead)
and an allocated portion of any selling and administrative costs charged to the
division by the central office of the company.

The full cost price used for trans

fer pricing might be an estimate based on the historical costs of the prior period.
On the other hand, it might be a standard cost --a scientifically predetermined
cost which provides a basis for measuring actual performance.
The use of either standard or full cost as a transfer price preclydes any
evaluation of the operating unit as a profit center because transfer prices will
equal cost. When transfer prices equal cost, there can be no profit for the operat
ing unit.

There are two situations where a cost transfer price may be useful

—

when intracompany transfers are insignificant and when it is not practical to
evaluate the operating unit as a profit center.
Intracompany transfers are usually insignificant in a company which is
decentralized along product lines.

This means that each division produces and

sells a product without any contribution from other divisions. In the few instances
v/here transfers do occur, cost is the simplest method of accounting for the transfer.
There are some business activities which are an integral part of the company
operations that do not lend themselves to profit evaluations. An example might be
a unit devoted to research and development.

Becouse it is not practical to evaluate

this type of activity in terms of profits, pricing transfers at cost may be appropriate.

Morton Backer and Lyle E. Jacobsen, Cost Accounting; A Management
Approach (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 274.
~~
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Marginal Cost
Marginal cost is the additional cost of production resulting from the
increase in output by one unit.

3

Marginal cost would include only out-of-

pocket costs such as direct labor, material, and any increase in overhead caused
by the increase in output. Because intracompany transfers priced on a marginal
cost basis would not cover full costs, the resulting net losses on divisional income
statements would be meaningless as a basis for evaluating a division's performance.
Because marginal cost is difficult to determine in actual practice, an
approximation of marginal cost is often used. This involves calculating the
variable or direct cost of producing and selling. Variable costs are cosits that
vary directly with the number of units produced.

4

They differ from mapginal

costs in that they are an average cost. Thus variable cost is an average^increase
in production costs per unit increase in production over a given output mange.
Cost Plus g Fair Return
Cost plus a fair return differs from a transfer price based solely on cost in
that an amount is added to cost to provide a profit on the merchandise transferred
to another division. There are a number of variations of this system of transfer
pricing . The cost base may be full cost or standard cost. The add-on may range
from a very nominal amount up to a substantial markup that earns the division an
impressive return on its investment.

^Myron H. Umbreit, Elgin F. Hunt, and Charles V- Kinter, Economics.
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957), p. 293.

4

Backer and Jacobsen, p. 118.
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To illustrate, assume that a plywood manufacturer transfers veneer from
the veneer division to the panel division at the veneer division's cost plus seven
per cent.

If the unit cost of a given type of veneer is forty cents per foot, the

transfer price would be 42.8 cents per foot (40'^2.8). The profit to the veneer
division would be 2.8 cents per foot or seven per cent of the cost of each foot
sold. Because the divisional profit is determined by the footage sold, volume is
the only determinant of profits.

Profits based on costs are not a satisfactory basis

for evaluating divisional performance because there is no incentive for the division
manager to reduqe costs and increase efficiency.

All costs incurred will be

covered by the transfer price. !n fact, the higher the division's costs, the greater
its profits will be.
Market
An intracompany price obtained from published market prices of like or
similar products is often suggested. A market-based transfer price appears, at
first, to be an ideal solution to the transfer pricing problem.

Divisional profits

resulting from a market-based transfer price should be a good basis for evdluating
the division's performance because the transfer price represents the price the divi
sion would receive if it sold its products outside the company.

There are, however,

a number of problems that arise when market-based transfer prices are used.

These

problems include the following:
1.

There are a number of products which do not have quoted prices.

2,

The quoted market may not be a real alternative^, i.e., the prod
ucts in the market are not acceptable to the purchasing division.

14
3.

The purchasing or selling division may be able to influence the
quoted price in a small market by entering the market as a buyer
or a seller.

4.

The quoted market price may be subject to wide fluctuations which
may make it unacceptable for transfer pricing purposes.

These problems will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. Their introduction here
serves to indicate that it is often extremely difficult to determine what market
really is.

The difficulty in determining what a market price might be for a given

product supports the position that market-based transfer prices are not very
effective.
Negotiated Prices
A negotiated transfer price is a price achieved by arms-length bargain
ing between the division managers or their delegates. If both parties to the nego
tiations are well informed as to current market prices^, production costs^ and other
relevant data, they should be able to agree on a price that is fair to both parties.
A negotiated price is an attempt to achieve the ideal of having these prices deter
mined by the forces of supply and demand, i.e., to approximate a real market
price. The fact that the negotiators are often more limited in their alternatives as
bargainers than would be the case in a real market situation presents a problem.
The purchasing division may have no choice but to buy from the selling division,
and the selling division may be in a similar position. These limitations introduce
the need for at least some central supervision of negotiated pricing.

A^ystem of

appeal or mediation often satisfies this need by providing a release valve for
deadlocked negotiations.

CHAPTER ! 11
TRANSFER PRICING AND EVALUATION OF PROFIT CENTERS

Difficulties in Detennining Useful Transfer Prices
When an operating unit is to be evaluated in terms of profits earned,
all the factors affecting these profits should be the same as though the division were
a completely independent company.

Transfer prices are often an important det«r-

minant of divisional profits, and we have already observed that these prices are
not determined in the same manner as prices between separate companies. Separate
companies would determine prices by arms-length bargaining.

Transfer prices are

not market-determined prices, strictly speaking, and are ordinarily arrived at by
taking into account 1) cost, 2) cost plus a markup,
or 5) negotiated prices.

3) marginal cost, 4) market,

Discussion of the difficulties of determining a useful

transfer price follows.
In the first chapter it was stated that a basic objective of profit center
decentralization is the delegation of responsibility for earning profits to the divi
sion managers.

Ideally, the evaluation of the division managers would be based

1
only on the profits their division earns.

Top management would not intervene in

the internal affairs of the division unless profits are inadequate.

Because divisi

onal profits are affected by the transfer price, the pricing method used is
important.

Joel Dean, p. 67.
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Cost
Evaluation of the division's performance in terms of profits is not possible
when cost or cost-based transfer prices are used.

The reasons for this assertion were

discussed in Chapter I I. However, a combination of cost and market-based trans
fer prices has merit.
Robert McLain has proposed a combination of cost plus a markup and mar-

2
ket-based prices.

He suggests a transfer price computed by adding to cost a mark

up equal to that charged other companies. This computed price would then be held
constant even though prices to other companies may fluctuate. Changes in this
transfer price would be made only when it results in misleading profit evaluations.
This would probably occur when the transfer price gets too far out of line with
current market prices.
Unlike an ordinary cost system, McLain's proposal requires the selling
division to absorb any changes in its costs.

This gives the selling division manager

incentive to cut costs and improve efficiency. This incentive is lacking in the
ordinary cost-plus system because the profit is tied to costs. As costs increase,
profits increase. By holding the transfer price constant, this problem is removed.
A stable transfer price is another advantage. Unstable or fluctuating
transfer prices are undesirable because they tend to affect production levels
When transfer prices fluctuate, the purchasing division may be willing to curtail

2

Robert K. McLain, "Transfer Pricing Can Contribute to Divisional
Performance Evaluation, " National Association of Accountants Bulletin,
August, 1963, pp. 29-32.
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production in anticipation of a drop in prices.

This reduction in output may

improve the purchasing division's profits, but at the expense of the selling division.
When this speculation is carried to the extent of affecting sales, it may actually
reduce company profits.
McLain's proposal may be a solution to the transfer pricing problem if
it is the best method to meet a particular company's objectives.
when quoted market prices are unacceptable.

This may occur

Discussion of quoted market

prices follows .
Market-based Pricing
For purposes of evaluating an operating unit in terms of profits, a com
petitive market price should produce the best results. A competitive market
exists when a market has many buyers and sellers handling the same product.
The transactions of any one buyer or seller would not affect the market's price
level.

It is important that the market price be competitive so that neither divi

sion can affect the transfer price.

When intracompany transfers are recorded at

market, the buying and the selling divisions are in the same position as independent companies with regard to pricing of their products.
Market-based intracompany prices are derived from quoted market
prices, the published result of current transactions in an existing market. The
usefulness of market for pricing intracompany transfers is somewhat limited for
many products.

The situations which may limit the use of a market-based

transfer price are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Products which have no quoted price
The first problem is that there are many products for which rro price
list exists,

A product may have no quoted price when only a few firms deal in

the market or when the product is so unique that the only buyer is the purchasing
division.

An example might be transmissions for John Deere tractors which can

be used only for assembly or repair of these tractors.
A market-based transfer price is advantageous because the selling
division receives the same price it would receive if the goods were sold outside
the company and the buying division pays the same price it would have to pay to
purchase the product outside the company.

The price is fair to both divisions.

If no market exists, it may be desirable to estimate a market price so that the
transfer price will be fair to both divisions. There are two common methods of
estimating a market price . They are negotiated pricing and asking for bids.
Because of its importance, negotiated pricing will be discussed in detail in a
following section of this chapter.
Asking for bids from outside companies as well as brother divisions Is
one means of ^timating a market price.

To be effective, the outside compani«s

must have expectations of obtaining at least a portion of the buying division's,
business.

If the outside companies do not expect to receive any orders, they can

hardly bp expected to take the bidding seriously.

If they do not take the bidding

seriously, these bids may not be what they think the product is worth, and the
resulting transfer prices would then be somewhat unreliable.

This means that even

when the selling division is consistently the low bidder, some purchases will have
to be placed with the outside bidders.

19
Market is not an alternative
The second problem involves products that are differentiated. This
means that while the products are essentially the same,some differentiating char
acteristics exist.

For example, the color, detergent additives and packing of

motor oils are differentiating characteristics. The marketing division of an oil
company would not use the motor oil produced by the refining division of a
another oil company because of specific differences in their motor oils. A
quoted price for a specific quality of motor oil can be obtained, but this price
should not be used for pricing intracompany transfers unless the economic value
of the product differences are excluded from the market price.

It would not be

fair to the selling division to require costly differences not included in the
market product and then^price the transfer at market.
An "influenced" market
When a market is not perfectly competitive, a division may be able to
influence price levels in the market used to price its intracompany transfers.

By

varying the volume of its transactions in the market, the division can change the
level of supply or demand.
prices to fluctuate.

A change in the level of supply or demand will cause

The ability of one division to manipulate transfer prices and

thereby improve its profits at the expense of another division is undesirable.
Profits resulting from manipulation of this sort will distort the evaluation of both
divisions.
Unstable markets
An unstable market price is not a desirable transfer price. In the
previous discussion of McLain's proposed combination of cost and market-based

20
transfer pricing, the undesirable effect of unstable transfer prices was brought
out. An example would be the pricing of grain transferred from the elevator to
the milling division of a flour company. Grain prices sometimes fluctuate widely
and rapidly.

The divisional profits may tend to reflect which division is best

able to take advantage of this fluctuation. The selling division would try to
make most of its deliveries when prices are high, and the purchasing division
would try to do most of its buying when prices are low . Simultaneous achieve
ment of these aims is impossible. The division which gains the upper hand in
this conflict will tend to show better profits, but these profits will not neces
sarily indicate an increased contribution to the profits of the firm as a whole.
When a division's net profits are increased at the expense of another division,
there is no change in the profits of the firm as a whole.
Negotiated Pricing
The use of negotiated pricing to estimate a market price was noted in
the discussion of market-based transfer pricing. Negotiation is defined as mutual
discussion and arrangement of the terms of a transaction or agreement.

3

A rep

resentative from each of the affected divisions would meet to agree on a price to
value the transfers between their divisions.

Because the cost of these conferences

in terms of executive time would be high, it is important that the price agreed
on should remain in effect for a reasonably long period of time.

3

.
The American College Dictionary, ed. Clarence L. Barnhart
(New York; Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951), p. 813.
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A negotiated transfer price differs from other types of transfer pricing
in that it is determined by both affected divisions rather than one of the divisions
or outside factors.

The negotiations will be influenced by such factors as cost

and market price, but the resulting transfer price is a result of their agreement
rather than any objective factors.
In negotiating a transfer price, bargainers occasionally will be unable
to reach an agreement.

The possibility of a deadlock gives rise to the need for a

method of reconciliation . Arbitration by top management is not satisfactory.

A

price set by higher authority is not likely to satisfy either division manager. This
may result in ill-feeling and dissension.

A solution to this problem is suggested

in the following discussion of a transfer pricing method proposed by Joel Dean.
Joel Dean's proposal
Joel Dean has proposed a negotiated pricing system which he calls com_
_
4
petitive pricing.

Competitive pricing, as used by Dean, refers to pricss

achieved through unrestricted bargaining between division managers. Require
ments for success of his competitive pricing system are good cost and mas^cet infor
mation, alternative sources of supply, and a well-planned implementation of the
pricing system.
1.

5
Dean states that his pricing system has the following advantages;
The disadvantages of published market prices, as previously dis
cussed in this paper, are solved.

4

5

Joel Dean, pp. 65-74.

Ibid.,

p. 68.
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2.

An "economically correct" transfer price will insure that decisions
increasing divisional profits will increase profits of the company.

3.

Negotiated transfer prices strengthen the independence of the
operating divisions which makes profit evaluation more mecsningful .

4.

A negotiated transfer prevents hidden losses in misdirected capital
investments and in friction and dissension among executives that
can be caused by a bad transfer price.

5.

Transfer prices negotiated by informed managers are sensitive to
changes in supply and demand as reflected in competitive alter
natives. The process of negotiation by trained executives, in
itself, tends to avoid arbitrariness which could cause friction and
ill-feeling.

Once in operation, "competitive pricing" would operate smoothly,
according to Dean . Before the new method is installed, a careful study of the
company's market environment and how the concept of negotiated relatior»hips
would best bit the economies of its operations should be completed. In addition,
the qualifications of the personnel who will be negotiating transfer prices should
be evaluated at this time. If there is a question as to their ability to arrive at

6

satisfactory prices, some restrictions are needed. Restrictions listed by Dean are;
1.

Pricing guides.

6
Ibid., p, 71 .
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2,

Temporary price limits .

3.

Limits on the volume of outside trading.

These limitations would be temporary; they would be lifted as the negotiators
(division managers) become more experienced.
Top management should supervise the activities of the negotiators by
use of a mediator. The mediator would aid negotiations by providing unbiased
information and putting aside exaggerated or prejudiced information. Mediation
is the most desirable means of breaking deadlocks because the final agreement
is still in the hands of the negotiators.
Evaluation of negotiated pricing
As a method of estimating a market price, negotiated pricing appears
to be reasonably satisfactory. The resulting transfer price is free from the defects
common to market prices taken directly from imperfectly competitive markets,
i .e., the price can not be affected by either division except over the bargain
ing table and the price is relatively stable.

Disadvantages of negotiated pricing

may include the drain on executive time caused by negotiations and the possibil
ity of the negotiators reaching a deadlock that mediation will not bpeak. When
this occurs, top management will have to step in and resolve the conflict ev>en
though the results are not likely to satisfy either party to the negotiations.
An analysis of negotiated transfer pricing by Harold Bierman brings out
another potential defect in negotiated pricing.

This analysis indicates that

Harold Bierman, Jr., Topics in Cost Accounting and Decisions
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 76-102.
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when either division gains control of the negotiations, it may tend to set produc
tion levels and prices at other than optimum levels for the firm as a whole.
To simplify the analysis, Bierman makes the following assumptions:
1.

8

A manufacturing division makes a product which has no inter
mediate market, i.e., it must be sold to the distribution division.

2.

The price of the product sold by the distribution division is set by
purely competitive forces and the company cannot influence the
price. The average revenue or price line is horizontal, and the
same line would also measure the company's marginal revenues.

Figure Number 1 shows the determination of optimum output for the
firm. Curves MC , and MC
d
m
manufacturing divisions

are marginal cost curves for the distribution and
®

respectively.

Adding the marginal costs of both divi

sions together results in the total marginal cost of the firm represented by
curve MCj

.

The intersection of this total marginal cost curve with
9

the price line, PP, determines the optimum output of the product.

At that

level of production, marginal cost equals marginal revenue, the amount earned

10
by selling another unit of the firm's product.

This optimum output is OQ or

or PR. Profits are maximized at this point because production of few units would

^Ibid., p. 93.

'ibid., p. 94.
^^Alfred W. Stonier and Douglas C. Hague, A Textbook of Economic
Theory (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 90.
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Figure 1

— Determining optimum output
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— Distribution division as monopolistic buyer
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mean that profits could be increased by increasing output.

Production of more than

OQ units would result in the cost of each unit produced exceeding the revenues it
brings in.
By limiting output and sales (acting as a monQpolistlc buyer), the dis
tribution division could maximize its own profits at the expense of the manufactur
ing division and the firm as a whole.

Thi§ situation is illustrated in Figure Number

2.
Cyrve ARjj represents the average net revenue curve of the distribution
division, assuming that transfers between the manufacturing division and the dis
tribution division are priced at thi manufacturing division's marginal cMt. Thk
curve (ARjj) is the difference between th© price of the end product (PP) and the
price (MCj^ Qr P^) which would be paid to the manufacturing division.
Curve mrj is the marginal revenue curve for the distribution division.
To maximize its own profits, the distribution division will restrict sales to quan
tity OS since at this point its marginal revenue (mr^j) equals marginal cost
(MCj).

Since OS is less than OQ, the profits of the firm will be decreased.

The

distribution division's profits are increased at the expense of the manufacturing
division and the firm as a whole.
By acting as a monopolistic seller, the manufacturing division can also
increase its profits at the expense of the rest of the firm.

In Figure Number 3,

curve MCj, the marginal cost of the distribution division, is assumed to b& the
minimum revenue that the distribution division will require to increase its sale of
the product. This curve then may be labeled r^,

the minimum net revenue
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required by the distribution division.
We can now draw the average net revenue curve for the manufacturing
division,'

ARm .

Curve ARm is the difference between the r
price of the end r
pro-

duct, pp, and the minimum revenue curve for the distribution division, r^.
Curve mr^ represents the marginal revenue curve of the manufacturing division.
The manufacturing division can be expected to produce OY units becatjse at this
level of output its marginal revenue equals marginal costv

Again, the division

has increased its own profits at the expense of the firm as a whole since OY units
is less than the optimum level of output for the firm, OQ.
This,analysis indicates that negotiations to determine transfer prices
may result in output levels which may not be desirable in terms of maximizing the
profits of the firm. This potential weakness in negotiated pricing is an additional
argument for supervision when this system of pricing intracompany transfers is used.
Conclusion
Evaluation of a decentralized operating unit should be based primarily
on profits earned. The effect of transfer pricing on divisional profits requires that
careful consideration be given to choosing the best transfer pricing method. The
best transfer pricing method for a particular company will depend on the economic
environment in which it operates.

The foregoing discussions of transfer pricing

methods indicate that no one transfer pricing method is ideal in all possible busi
ness situations.

Only by evaluating each transfer pricing method in terms of the

objectives and environment of their company, can a company's management
determine the best transfer pricing method for their use. Even then their
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evaluation process v/ill have to include consideration of the effectiveness of the
transfer pricing method during the period under reviev/.

CHAPTER IV
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSFER PRICING IN DECISION MAKING

One of the basic principles of profit center decentralization is that the
operating units should be evaluated in terms of profits. For this evaluation to be
effective, the division manager should control most of the major determinants of
profits. As listed in Chapter I, the division manager should have considerable
discretion in determining operating methods, production volume, and product
mix. Two other decision areas that v/ill affect divisional profits are pricing and
capital budgeting.
The division manager's authority is often restricted in the areas of
capital budgeting and pricing. Capital budgeting decisions of large size usually
require major financing arrangements such as the issue of additional stock or the
sale of bonds.

In addition, this type of decision will, in large part, determine

the profitability of the firm as a whole over a number of years. Because of their
major affect on the firm's future, capital budgeting decisions are usually subject
to limitations when delegated to the division management. These limitations
sometimes take the form of dollar limits on projects originated by the division
management.
Restrictions in the area of pricing occur for a number of reasons.

It has

already been pointed out that intracompany prices have a significant effect on
divisional revenue and cost figures. The division manager, as a decision maker^
will be influenced by his division's revenue and cost figures. An unsatisfactory
transfer price could lead to incorrect decisions by distorting this divisional data.
This may be particularly true in the case of capital-budgeting decisions. The
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effect of transfer-pricing methods on decision making in the areas of capital
budgeting, pricing goods to outsiders, and the effect of transfer pricing on
middle management morale will be discussed in the following sections of this
chapter.
Capital Budgeting Decisions
Capital budgeting is the systematic planning and the resultant
decision making for acquisition or construction of capital assets.

Capital assets

may be defined as long-lived facilities used in the business, such as machinery
or buildings.

A business firm has limited resources to allocate to this activity

and, for this reason, must evaluate alternative proposals and choose those that
are most beneficial to the firm. The decision-making process is predicated upon
estimates of the future.

Funds committed to a capital investment are recovered

over a relatively long period of time. Consequently, capital investments are sub
ject to an element of risk and uncertainty with regard to recovery of cost.

With

this unavoidable risk and uncertainty inherent in the basic projections, it is impor
tant that the firm establish a procedure for arranging the information in a logical
pattern which will facilitate selection of the most desirable investment proposals.
When a division manager is given authority to make capital expendi
tures, he should develop and use certain basic information. This data should
include the following:
1.

An evaluation of the division's economic future

^Backer and Jacobsen, p. 543.

— Capital
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expendii-ures should be made in accordance with a plan-

This

plan should project an orderly progress toward certain objectives.
These objectives would be determined by top management. Tbe
division manager should evaluate these objectives in the light of
a projection of future economic activity for the division when
making capital expenditure decisions.
2.

The rate of obsolescence for the item to be acquired — If the
capital item to be acquired will be obsolete in a very short time,
its earnings potential must be proportionately higher to justify the
investment.

3.

The future earnings increase resulting from the expenditures —
Investment in capital assets should result in increased earnings.
An evaluation of the proposed capital expenditure's contribution
to divisional profits throughout its life is a significant measure of
its v/orth to the division.

4.

The initial cost of the capital asset

— The initial cost includes

purchase price, transportation costs^ and any costs incurred in put
ting the capital asset into operating condition. This combination
of costs reveals the immediate outlay of cash or debt necessary to
receive the future increase in revenue estimated in Item 3 above.
A number of systems have been devised to formulate the analysis of the
above information. The methods which provide the bes^t results estimate the present
value or current worth of the capital investment's future earnings. By comparing
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this amount with the outlay necessary to acquire the capital asset, the return on
the investment may be determined. Investment decisions based on the comparison
of the returns the various proposals will earn on their required investment should
result in the best capital investments.
Some of the methods that have been developed to estimate or evaluate
the current worth of a capital investment's contributions to future earnings are;
1.

2

The discounted cash flow method --*^n interest rate is calculated
which will discount the expected future cash flow from the invest
ment back to the present value of the investment. Comparison of
the interest rate on different proposals will indicate which propo
sals are the most desirable .

2.

The excess-present-value method

— Estimated cash income from

the investment is discounted at an established interest rate.

The

interest rate will vary according to the risk involved, but should
be higher than the cost of capital to the firm. The present value
of the projected cash flows must exceed the present value of the
proposed investment in order for the investment to be worth con
sideration.

Sn evaluating alternative proposals, the investment

with the largest excess of present value of future cash flows over
present value of the investment would be considered the best
investment.
3.

The Terborgh, or MAPI, method — By use of a prepared graph.

^Ibid.,

pp. 564-570.
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the timing of replacements is evaluated under this method. The
economic desirability of replacement is determined by comparing
the cost of keeping the present facility with the cost of buying
the new facility on a time-adjusted basis.
In all of the above methods, future projections play an important roleThese projects are undoubtedly affected by historical revenue and cost data.
Any distortion of divisional cost or revenue data by unfair or misleading transfer
prices may result in erroneous projections and thereby cause incorrect capital
budgeting decisions.
The transfer-pricing method used does not matter as long as the capital
budgeting procedure takes into account the effect of the transfer pricing method
in use on the projections used to evaluate capital investment proposals.

A

market-based transfer price will tend to put the division in the position of an
independent company while a cost transfer price will tend to give a better
picture of the costs of the firm as a whole .
If a market-based transfer price or a negotiated price is used, the capitalbudgeting analysis will tend to indicate the most desirable investment for the divi
sion as an independent entity.

Because of the imperfections in intracompany pric

ing methods noted in Chapter 11 I, this may not be the most desirable investment
for the firm as a whole. For example, if the transfer price is taken from an imper
fectly competitive market without modification and the selling division is manipula
ting the supply of goods in the market to keep prices high, projections of revenues
to be added by a proposed capital investment for the selling division may indicate
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that an investment is desirable when it is really not so.
To reduce the possibility of undesirable capital investment decisions, it
is necessary to restrict the division manager's authority in this area.

In order to

retain the maximum degree of decentralization, this restriction is often in the
form of a dollar limit. Only when investment decisions Income large enough to
have a serious effect on the company as a whole is it necessary to restrict the
delegation of authority to the division manager.
Return on investment
Capital assets (plant and equipment) also have>a major effect on another
aspect of decentralization.

When the return earned on the company's investment

in the division is used to evaluate the division's performance, decisions regarding
methods of computing just what the company's investment in the division is,
become very important.
The return-on-investment computation, an evaluation tool, is discussed
here rather than in Chapter 1 !l because of its close relation to capital assets and
capital budgeting decisions.

Because of the current popularity of the return on

investment as a method of evaluating profit centers, considerable effort will be
made to point out its weaknesses as well as its advantages.
Return on investment is the net profit divided by the average investment.

3

The net profit is subject to the effects of transfer pricing methods as

discussed in Chapter Mi. If the profit figure is distorted by an unsatisfactory

^jbid., p. 436.
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transfer price, the return on investment will also be distorted.

Evaluation based

on the return on investment does not lessen the importance of a reliable transfer
price.
The investment base in the computation presents an additional problem
in this type ©f evaluation. Three determinations of significance are 1) which
assets should be included in the investment base; 2) allocation of asset invest
ment to plants, divisions, product lines, or other internal sectors; and 3)
valuation of the investment base.
The assets included in the investment base for computation of the
return on investment should be only those assets directly related to the produc
tion of income.

Earnings from general business assets such as investments are

not included in a division's profits, and these investments should be excluded
from the division's investment base.
Allocation of indirect assets such as central office cash and research
and development facilities should be apportioned on some logical basis-such as
the division's use of the asset or facility.

As in the case of allocating the

expenses of service units, it may be best to exclude such areas of the firm from
the evaluation of the operating units.
Valuation of the investment base refers to the question of whether
capital assets should be included in the investment base at acquisition-cost, book
value (acquisition cost less accumulated depreciation), or some approximation of
current economic value. Current economic value is often computed by reducing
the asset's replacement value by accumulated depreciation. The accumulated
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depreciation would be determined by applying the assefs established ctepreciation
rat& to the replacement value for the number of years the asset has been in use.
John Deardon illustrates the importance of considering valuation
bases when using return on investment to evaluate profit centers.

He states that

the combination of valuation methods and depreciation methods will determine
the effectiveness of return on investment as a guide to decision making and
evaluations regarding profit centers.

4

A summary of his analysis of the four com

mon combinations follows.
Gross book value and composite depreciation
The combination of gross book value and composite depreciation is the
least desirable when the return on investment is to be used for investment decision
making and evaluation. Gross book value is the acquisition cost of the facilities
(plant and equipment) while composite depreciation is a method whereby fixed
assets are grouped together and depreciation Is taken by applying a rate based
on an estimated average life for the whole group. An asset is assumed to be
fully depreciated when it is retired under the composite method.

The weakness

of the combination can be shown by considering two investment situations.
First of all, the operating unit manager is encouraged to dispose of
idle equipment regardless of its potential use. This is because idle facilities tend
to reduce his return on investment. The cost of such assets are included in the
investment base, and depreciation on this cost reduces the operating unit's net

^John Dearden, "Problem in Decentralized Profit Responsibility,"
Harvard Business Review, XXXVH I (May-June, 1960), pp. 79-86.
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profit.

By disposing of the asset, the division manager can reduce his invest

ment base and increase profits.
For example, if the idle facilities cost $50,000 and are subj^t to a
depreciation rate of 10%, the effect of their disposal can be illustrated as follows:
Decrease in investment
Total assets prior
Less cost of asset
Total assets after

base
to retirement
retired
retirement

$250,000
50,000
$200,000

Increase in profits
Net profit — depreciation on idle
facilities included
Add back depreciation on idle
facilities
Net profit

$ 25,000
5,000

— idle facilities retired

Return on investment
Idle facilities not retired
Net profit
25,000
Total assets
Idle facilities retired
Net profit
Total assets

$ 30,000

_

250,000
30,000

-

200,000

The increase in the return on investment available through the retirement of idle
facilities makes no allowance for potential future use of the equipment and it may
encourage retirement of potentially useful facilities.
Secondly, the combination of gross book value and composite depreci
ation may impair the timing of investments in more efficient facilities. The timing
of investments of this type should be based on the cost of keeping the old asset as
compared with the cost of acquiring the replacement.

Backer and Jacobsen, p. 545.

5

When gross book value is
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combined with composite depreciation, the division's investment base is changed
only by the difference between the cost of the asset to be replaced and the cost
of its more efficient replacement.

This may lead the division manager to base his

evaluation on the change in his investment base rather than the costs involved.
For example, assume that a machine costing $120,000 can increase
future earnings by approximately $20,000 a year over a ten-year useful life. The
machine it would replace has a similar useful life and cost $100,000. The combi
nation of gross book value and composite depreciation encourages the division
manager to make an analysis similar to the following;
Increase in investment base
Cost added (new machine)
Cost deducted (old machine)

$120,000
100,000

$ 20,000
Increase in earnings
Increase in earnings from new machine
Less; increase in depreciation
Depreciation —
new machine
$12,000
Depreciation —
old machine
$ 10,000

$ 20,000

2,000

$18, 000
Return on investment
=

90%

20,000
This relatively high rate of return might encourage the division manager to make
the replacement. But what effect will the investment have on the return on invest
ment earned by the company as a whole? The following analysis is the "account
ing" method of evaluation investments in capital assets.
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Cash outlay for new machine
Return
Increase in earning^
Less:
annual
depreciation
Return on investment

$120,000
$20,000
12,000

$

8,000

— = 6.7%

120,000
This much lower result emphasizes how misleading the analysis encouraged by the
combination of gross book value and composite depreciation con be.
Gross book value and unit depreciation
The combination of gross book value and unit depreciation is an improve
ment over the prior example.
is called unit depreciation.

Depreciation computed separately on each facility
While the investment base for the return on invest

ment computation is still valued at gross book value (cost), recording retire
ments under unit depreciation means a loss must be recognized when partially
depreciated idle facilities are retired.

As an example, suppose a machine cost

ing $100,000 with accumulated depreciation of $50P00is scrapped.

Assuming

that the cost of scrapping equals the machine's salvage value, composite depre
ciation would result in recognition of no gain or loss. The asset would be pre
sumed to be, fully depreciated and $100,000 would be removed from both the
group asset account and the accumulated depreciation for the group. If unit
depreciation is used, the machine and its related accumulated depreciation are
maintained in separate accounts.
disposal.

A loss of $50,000 will be recognized on the

When assets are retired, a loss will be recognized if it is not fully

depreciated.

The incentive to dispose of idle facilities which exists under composite
depreciation is removed by using unit depreciation.

Any loss on retirement of

idle facilities would have to be recognized. However, when facilities are
almost fully depreciated, the problem arises again.

The asset can then be

retired with little recognized loss, and the investment base for the retum-oninvestment computation is reduced without adverse affect on profits.
Net book value and unit depreciation
A more satisfactory combination includes net book value and unit
depreciation.

Net book value is gross book value reduced by accumulated depre

ciation. The incentive to scrap idle facilities,
removed.

fully depreciated or not, is

Because the investment base includes cost less accumulated depreci

ation, no reduction in investment results from the retirement of fully depreciated
assets. The investment base can be reduced by retirimg partially depreciated
assets, but the incentive to do so is reduced by the fact that a loss equal to the
reduction in investment base must be recognized because unit depreciation is
used.

As previously illustrated, unit depreciation requires separate recognition

of gain or loss on disposal of a capital asset.

The amount of the loss is the dif

ference between the cost of the asset and the accumulated depreciation v*4^ich
equals the net book value.
In both of the last two combinations, consideration of book loss was
a major factor in removing the incentive to retire idle facilities.

However,

6
book loss should not be considered when making investment decisions.

^jbid., p. 546

The
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example of a simple rate of return analysis noted previously illustrates the impor
tance of considering the future. Past expenditures are sunk costs. They cannot
be recovered, and they should not affect the evaluation of future expenditures.
Net book value and composite depreciation
Combining net book value with composite depreciation eliminates the
disadvantages previously mentioned. Book losses no longer affect investment
decisions because the assets are considered fully depreciated when retired.
Jletirement of an idle machine will reduce the group asset account and the
accumulated deprecation by the same amount because it is assumed to be fully
depreciated when composite depreciation is used.

Because the asset account and

the accumulated depreciation are reduced by the same amount, net book value
(cost less accumulated depreciation for the group) is not changed.
The only remaining problem is the reduction in depreciation expense
a retirement may offer. This problem can be solved by using declining balance
depreciation.

Declining-balance depreciation differs from other depreciation

methods in that the depreciation rate is applied to the net book vakie rather
than gross book value. A plant with an original cost of $100,000 and accumu
lated depreciation of $50,000, subject to a 10% depreciation rate, would have
on annual depreciation of $10,000 ($100,000 x 10%) under ordinary
(straight-line) depreciation methods.

When declining-balance ctepreciation is

used, the depreciation for the current year would be $5,000 (original cost less

W. Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (London:
MacMillan andCo., 1924), p. 164.

accumulated depreciation times the depreciation rate)

No decrease in deprecia

tion would result from a retirement because net book value (original cost less
accumulated depreciation) is not changed by a retirement when composite depre
ciation is used.

!n the above example, the retirement of a $10,000 idle machine

would reduce depreciation to $9,000 ($90,000 X 110%) under ordinary methods
but does not change the depreciation when declining-balance depreciation is
used ($90,000 - $40,000 = $50,000; $50,000 X10% - $5,000).
The combination of net book value and composite-declining-balance
depreciation appears to insure a community of interests between the division and
the company for investment decisions. However, there is a disadvantage to the
use of a return-on-investment evaluation we have not considered. A division
with a relatively high proportion of plant and equipment purchased prior to
1945 will tend to have a high rate of return due to a low investment base rather
than good performance. Because of the inflation that has occurred since World
War 1 1, the original cost of assets purchased before that time is often consider
ably below replacement cost. Their net book value will be low because of
large amounts of accumulated depreciation.
Comparing a division with a high proportion of these low-valued
assets to one that has a high proportion of new higher-valued assets would not be
very meaningful.

It would be very difficult to segregate the effect of asset ages

from the effect of earnings and efficient performance.

Also, a high rate of return

on investment caused by low-valued assets will tend to discourage division manage
ment when considering replacements which would increase their investment base.
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An example would occur when an asset which will earn the division a return of
say

8% is turned down because the division's current rate of return is higher when

this higher rate is due to a low investment base.
Deardon's proposal
Deardon has proposed a system which solves the problems described
above by using a valuation procedure distinct and separate from book valjues for

8

rate-of-return computations. The principal feotures of this system are as follows:
1.

The facilities assigned to a division are valued at their current
economic (market) value.

2.

Once established, the divisional investment is reduced periodi
cally by depreciation on a composite basis using th& decliningbalance method.

3.

Because composite-declining-balance depreciation is used,
there is no reduction in either investment or depreciation.
expense when an asset is retired.

4.

All additions to facilities, after the initial evaluations h@ve
been made, are valued at cost.

5.

Asset values may be changed when conditions warrantj, such as
when price levels change significantly or when a new manager
is assigned to the division and it is necessary to erase the mis
takes of the prior manager.

8
Deardon, p. 84.
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The advantages of Dearden's proposal over book value as an investment
9
basis for a return-on-investment evaluation are given by him as follows;
1.

The investment base of the division will motivate division managers
to act in the best interests of the company when replacing or
retiring facilities.

2.

Divisional rates of return on invested capital will not be dis
torted by abnormally low asset values,

3.

The division is provided with a more realistic basis for pricing
and costing its products.

4.

Top management has a more useful tool for evaluating divisional
management in that comparisons between divisions are more mean
ingful and the mistakes of a replaced manager can be erased by
adjusting values, thus relieving the new manager from the burden
of his predecessor's mistakes.

The separation of regular accounting records from data to be used for
evaluation of a profit center has considerable merit.

Many of the problems that

arise in attempting to establish satisfactory controls over decentralized profit
centers result from the failure of ordinary accounting data to establish a commu
nity of interests between the company and the profit center.
Dissension
Many companies compensate division managers on a profit-sharing
basis.

This is done to encourage their interest in the division's profits. The

implication of such a profit-sharing plan is that the division manager controls

9

Ibid., p. 85
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the factors determining profits and will be motivated to increase profite if his per
sonal income v/ill be increased by his actions.

However, arbitrarily imposed trans

fer prices and allocation of central office costs are factors affecting divisional
profits determined by top management.

If the division manager feels that these

factors are unfair, dissension and ill-feeling can result.
The allocation of central office costs can be equitable if they are
charged to the division as the services of the central office are actually used.
However, it is often difficult to determine how much of a particular service the
division uses. - For example, the president of a company would probably spend
most of his time supervising and planning for the company as a whole, and there
is not likely to be any objective way of allocating his salary to the division.
To avoid this problem, the profit figure used for evaluation of the division and
for determining the division manager's compensation should be divisional profits
before allocation of central office costs.
Internal dissension may be caused by an arbitrary transfer price. To
avoid dissension, the division manager must feel that the transfer price is fair.
A fair transfer price should approximate the price the division manager could
receive outside the company.

As indicated in Chapter 11 1, market-based and

negotiated transfer prices should approximate this goal.
Decentralization often represents a radical departure from prior manage
ment practice. Because decentralization is often a major change, it tends to
unsettle division management.

A certain amount of uneasiness can occur even when

a satisfactory transfer pricing method is used and central office costs are excluded

from divisional profit statements. To minimize any resistance to decentralization,
education and pre-selling of this philosophy is necessary.

This will help prepare

divisional management for the additional responsibilities decentralization places
on them.

These efforts may also smooth the transition to decentralization»
Pricing Products Sold Outside the Company
Information necessary to price products should be provided to divi

sions selling outside the company. The necessary information includes current
levels of output, production capacity, marginal cost, total cost to produce, and
market data. Tb« transfer-pricing method used should provide cost data from
,

other processing divisions.

None of the transfer-pricing methods automatically

provides all of the necessary cost information.

The more desirable pricing methods

for evaluating divisional performance, market-based and negotiated pricing,
actually conceal all cost data from other divisions contributing to the product.
To provide the desired cost and production information, it must be accu
mulated and passed on by each division contributing to the product. This informa
tion can be accumulated by using a procedyre suggested by Paul Cook.
gests the use of a voucher to accompany intracompany transfers.

He sug

This voucher

would detail the transfer price, accumulated variable costs (to approximate mar
ginal cost), and overhead added by preceding divisions. Cook's proposal does not
include level of output and production capacity for each division, but this infor
mation could easily be added to the voucher.

Paul Cook,

"New Technique for Intracompany Pricing," Harvard

Business Review, XXXV (July-August, 1957), p. 78.

CHAPTER V
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SUMMARY

It has been suggested that the recent developments in information tech
nology would reverse the trend toward decentralization that has existed since World
War 11. ^

The combination of high speed computers and sophisticated methods of

quantitative analysis have greatly increased the quality of information available
to top management.

With this improved information available to top managment,

the need for decentralization to bring management decision levels closer to the
transactions is reduced. A wealth of data relevant to a particular decision can
now be made available to top management.
This opinion on the effects of information technological improvements
ignores two factors.

First, there are some types of decisions which are not sub

ject to quantification.

These are, in the words of John BuHingame,

. .the

decisions involving human beings and intangible subjective human values; the
balancing of social, morale, and economic values; and the assessment of situa
tions in which information needs cannot be adequately anticipated or adequately

2
filled."

Secondly, the advantages of delegating psofit responsibility, as noted

in Chapter 1, go beyond the lowering of the day-to-day decision-making level.
Of particular importance is the development of the middle managers.

^John F. Burlingame, "Information Techno logy and Decentralization,"
Harvard Business Review, XXXIX (November-December, 1961,)p. 121.

^Ibid., p. 122.
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Burlingame suggests that improvements in information technology will
reinforce the trend to decentralization.

3

One of the most significant problems

in a decentralized firm is the need for quality information at the middle-manage
ment level. The problems in pricing products at the time they are sold outside
the company is a good example of how important good information can be at the
division-management level.

Division managers Reed to -have access to data that

will clearly show the contribution of their division to the firm as a whole.

This

knowledge would be particularly significant if it increases unders^nd an^reduces
dissension between division managers and top management.
Summary
importance of planning
The decentralization of a large going concern should not be taken
lightly. The profound changes in management philosophy and individual respon
sibilities cannot help but cause a certain amount of uncertainty and unhappiness
among existing management personnel. Every effort should be made to minimize
these morale problems.

Education of divisional management and planning to avoid

unfair transfer pricing and allocation of costs to profit centers are important steps
which will help reduce these morale problems.

Division management education

on decentralization should include a detailed description of how decentralization
works, its philosophy, and what will be expected of them.

Planning for decentra

lization essentially requires the development of a controlled delegation of authority.

3
Ibid., p. 124.

When profit centers are used to control this delegation of authority, the company
must be divided into operating units and an effective system of profit evaluation
must be developed. This evaluation method must be fair to the personnel being
evaluated as well as serving as an effective management tool.
Selection of a transfer pricing method
During the planning for decentralization, the transfer-pricing method
should be determined. The method used should depend on the company's objec
tives in decentralization and the external data available.

If intracompany trans

fers will be a significant determinant of operating unit profits, decentralization
of profit responsibility will require the consideration of only two pricing methods.
Negotiated prices and competitive market prices are the two alternatives that
give prospect to satisfactory profit-based evaluations.
The advantages and disadvantages of both market and negotiated prices
should be considered in the light of the company's particular situation.
I

Where

competitive intermediate markets exist, it is not to the firm's advantage to use
4
anything but the market price.

While prior discussion indicated that negotiated

pricing is less desirable, it may be the best alternative if no perfectly competitive
market price exists. Most firms will probably find themselves somewhere between
these two extremes.

The more advantageous method for them will depend on the

factors mentioned in the respective discussions of negotiated and market-based
transfer pricing applied to the firm's environment.

___

_

^

^

^

^

^

__

^

^

^

_________

Harold Bierman, Jr., Topics in Cost Accounting and Decisions
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 90.
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Conclusion
The importance of the transfer pricing problem li«s in its effect on the
profit evaluation of operating unsts in a decentralized company. The difficulties
involved in adequately solving the transfer pricing problem place some qualifica
tions on such profit evaluations.

The following statement by- Harold Bierman is

5
particularly pertinent»

"At its best, accounting information is raw material,

which to be useful to management must be processed. Without analysis, any
intracompany pricing scheme may lead to faulty information and decisions."
In addition, profit evaluation should not be relied on to the exclusion
of other measures of performance.

As noted in Chapter 1, objectives other than

short-term profits such as personnel development, planning activities, labor
relations and civic responsibility should be considered. These other objectives
are important determinants of long-run profitability which is the real goal of a
profit-motivated business.

^ibid ., p. 90 .
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